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ABSTRACT
Coastal cities around the world are increasingly facing inundation hazards as urban expansion and
population growth change hydrologic systems in the floodplains and compounding impacts of
climate events accelerate and exacerbate these risks. The land and water dynamics in these
shifting landscapes intersect with biophysical and sociopolitical dimensions that shape uneven
flood vulnerability. This thesis explores the ways in which differential vulnerability to floods in
Jakarta has been produced since colonial rule and reproduced throughout major urban
development phases in postcolonial Jakarta. Applying the framework of political ecology, this
thesis investigates the three interconnected elements that are at play in the production of uneven
flood risks: (i) the changes in land cover associated with rapid urbanization, (ii) the constant need to
make room for water, and (iii) the inclination to turn to engineering solutions that are not context
specific during moments of crisis. With the analysis of remotely-sensed data, this thesis explores a
method to detect land cover change and their implications for modifying urban hydrology. Using
two case studies of flood mitigation infrastructure, this thesis examines the ways Jakarta have
navigated the tension between making room for water and maintaining space for people. It further
introduces the concept of co-production in developing solutions to flood mitigation and climate
adaptation actions, in the context of existing unequal power relations and the North-South divide.
Finally, this thesis puts forward the importance of understanding and challenging the colonial
legacy of fragmented water infrastructure and the ways they shape the production of uneven flood
vulnerability and perpetuate socio-spatial segmentation in Jakarta.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Indonesian government announced its plans to move its capital to a remote province in
Borneo island, as Jakarta subsides at an alarming rate with 40% of its coastal area sitting below
sea level. Flood events are annual occurrences in Jakarta but they have escalated in terms of
frequency and intensity. While sea level rise and climate change increase vulnerability to flooding,
Jakarta’s flood problems have been mainly caused by land subsidence associated with excessive
groundwater extraction and rapid urbanization. The case of a sinking city may have only come to
the fore recently, but Jakarta’s land subsidence has occurred since the 1980s when the country
embarked on an intense development phase. Since then, urbanization has continued to drive rapid
land use and land cover (LULC) change, putting pressure on Jakarta’s water resources and altering
the urban hydrological cycle. On the one hand access to water is getting more scarce, but on the
other hand water comes in the forms of floods, rains, and rising seas.
Jakarta is by nature a flood-prone area. It sits in a low and flat alluvial plain in the delta of 13 rivers,
of which the Ciliwung River is the biggest and the most influential to flood hazards in the city. With
an area of 347 square kilometers (or 134 square miles), Ciliwung watershed can be divided based on
its toposequence into six segments within three main parts (upstream, midstream, and
downstream) that cross over four administrative areas starting from the river basin upstream in
Bogor province to the downstream area in Jakarta. At the elevation of 300-3,000 meters above sea
level (BPPT, 2015), the upper part of Ciliwung watershed consists of forests and conservation areas
with predominantly andosol soils which are found in volcanic areas and have moderate to high
infiltration rates. The middle part of the watershed, at the elevation of 100-300 meters above sea
level (BPPT, 2015), has alluvial fans and volcanic rocks as the major composition of its soils.
Meanwhile, downstream in Jakarta comprises new alluvial soils which are vulnerable to
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compaction. Rapid urbanization and land cover change across the three parts of Ciliwung
watershed over time have had significant impacts on flooding downstream. In the context of
watershed governance, the recent implementation of decentralized local government system
nationally is considered an impediment to addressing challenges that are interlinked across
segments and parts of Ciliwung watershed.
Jakarta’s water insecurity is also a product of urban governance that facilitates direct socio-spatial
differentiation and fragmentation among populations, which began during the early Dutch colonial
intervention into Batavia’s water infrastructure and are sustained through the governance of water
networks in contemporary Jakarta (Kooy & Bakker, 2008a). Two specific forms of water
infrastructure that influence water insecurity in Jakarta are the system of canals and the urban
water supply network. These colonial water infrastructure systems have major implications for the
production of flood vulnerability and the reinforcement of socio-spatial segregation in postcolonial
Jakarta.
A system of canals requires the perpetual need to remove deposited sedimentation out of its
channels so water can flow through them into the sea instead of out onto surrounding land. The
limited piped water supply network has left the majority of populations dependent on groundwater
extraction to meet their needs. With the rapid pace of urbanization within and beyond Jakarta,
excessive groundwater extraction along with massive construction and natural consolidation of
alluvial soil has led to high rates of land subsidence; about one to 15 centimeters annually and up to
25 to 28 centimeters per annum in some areas (Abidin et al., 2011). As Jakarta sinks, its residents
are increasingly exposed to risks of sea level rise and flooding. Although flooding affects a wide
range of population groups in Jakarta, the existing socio-spatial differentiation and fragmentation
- 8 -
create conditions where flood events are unevenly experienced with regard to their intensity and
frequency.
Today, coastal cities around the world are increasingly facing flood risks due to land subsidence
and sea level rise. In a global network of delta cities, ideas around flood mitigation and climate
adaptation strategies are often produced through exchange. Knowledge sharing within the global
network is highly influenced by existing power relations and flows of capital. On the one hand, these
processes have allowed for the sharing of knowledge and expertise to mitigate floods as
experimented in other global cities. On the other hand, they have the capacity to perpetuate local
disconnectedness and exclusions of vulnerable communities if existing unequal power relations
are not addressed. In addition, the complexity of North-South relations in the context of a former
colony complicates the process and is prone to biases that influence decision making. As a result,
these processes manufacture solutions inappropriate to local contexts at best, and perpetuate
existing power structures at worst.
In other words, flood vulnerability in Jakarta is a product in an interplay of three elements: (i) rapid
urbanization and land cover change, (ii) the constant need to make room for water, and (iii) the
tendency to turn to highly visible engineering solutions to attract inflows of capital. This thesis
seeks to explore the ways in which these elements contribute to the production and reproduction
of water insecurity and uneven vulnerability to flooding.
Methodology
An urban political ecology framework is fitting for understanding the production of risks of water
insecurity in cities in the Global South, where urban planning began as an imported practice to
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control a colony through spatial transformations, and continued to maintain uneven spatial
development patterns and vulnerability to flood risks. In using political ecology as a theoretical
framework, I assess the biophysical and sociopolitical dimensions of the production, perception,
and experience of flood risks in Jakarta.
I combine this exploration with analyzing the development impact on land cover change during
Jakarta’s three urban transformation eras as categorized by Herlambang et al. (2018) as: (i)
autocratic neoliberal urbanism in 1988-1997, (ii) neoliberal urbanism in 1998-2005, and (iii) rescaled
neoliberal urbanism from 2006 until now. I employ a mixed-method research design integrating
quantitative and qualitative aspects to observe these changes. Using spatial analysis and remote
sensing techniques, quantitative data is generated to assess development patterns in flood-prone
areas. Combining results from the remote-sensing study, I draw my analysis on literature review,
policy documents, media reports, as well as interviews conducted with stakeholders from the
government, community organizations, and academia. The selection of interviewees was based
upon their knowledge, experience, and relevance to flood mitigation projects and strategies in
Jakarta including the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project and the Giant Sea Wall project.
Through a political ecology lens, I further examine the predisposition of certain areas and
population groups to be adversely affected by flood risks and the inclination to develop highly
engineered solutions to water insecurity. Between the identification of flood problems and the
production of engineering solutions through water infrastructure, I assess the processes in which
power relations, depoliticization, and the local disconnection in a global network play a role in
decision making. I use two case studies of water infrastructure projects in North Jakarta, the Pluit
Reservoir Revitalization project and the Giant Sea Wall project, to better understand the tension
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between responding to immediate needs of flood protection through technological infrastructure
and addressing social vulnerability in spaces of socio-environmental fragmentation.
Thesis Structure
I organize my arguments and analyses into six chapters. The first chapter introduces Jakarta as a
sinking city with challenges regarding water insecurity, in terms of both scarcity and excess,
uncovering flood vulnerability as a product of colonial legacies and uneven spatial development. It
describes the methods and approaches of this thesis.
In the second chapter, I begin with an overview of the political ecology of flood vulnerability in
Jakarta and navigate through the drivers of flood and climate risks by assessing the linkages
between urban development and changes in hydrology. I use a political ecology framework to
analyze water insecurity and flood vulnerability in Jakarta and the tendency to turn to highly
engineered infrastructure solutions to mitigate flooding. Through a political ecology lens, I go
through the biophysical and sociopolitical dimensions of flooding in Jakarta, dissecting changes in
LULC as well as in urban hydrology as drivers of flood and climate risks. The chapter further
uncovers the colonial legacy and politics of water infrastructure that produce and reproduce
uneven spatial development and flood vulnerability. The chapter concludes with Jakarta’s
predicament as a sinking city and a shared experience in a global-urban network.
The third chapter builds on the biophysical dimension of flood vulnerability by focusing on the land
and water dynamics measured through changes in land cover. Responding to the need to assess
urban and environmental changes at the local level, rather than downscaling global forecasts to
local scales, this chapter describes the process of classifying and measuring land cover types using
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satellite imagery and remote sensing techniques. The results and analysis of land cover change in
Jakarta as a whole and in its flood-prone areas are presented as baseline information for further
analysis and future research.
Chapters four and five are centered on two case studies of water infrastructure in North Jakarta
respectively: (i) the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project and (ii) the Giant Sea Wall project. The
fourth chapter describes the need to modify urban hydrology to protect Jakarta from flood risks.
Yet flood defense strategies are often implemented at the expense of the most vulnerable. The
Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project embodies this tension, raising issues around the natural limit
of development in Jakarta and its hydrological parameters, the formal-informal dichotomy, and the
perception of climate and flood risks. The chapter ends with the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization
project as part of a larger scheme in Jakarta’s flood mitigation efforts through hard infrastructure
projects. Chapter five focuses on the process and development of the Giant Sea Wall project,
unpacking the aspects of uneven power relations and capital flows in the production of an idea to
build a sea wall as a solution to Jakarta’s flood and climate problems. It further discusses the
challenges in adapting and implementing imported ideas that do not take into account local
contexts nor involve local communities, who will bear the greatest burdens of social and
environmental consequences as a result of the project. Finally, chapter six concludes my thesis
findings and their implications for planning practices that might be applicable to coastal cities in
the Global South that face a similar quandary.
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CHAPTER 2. THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF FLOOD VULNERABILITY IN JAKARTA
Flooding is an annual occurrence in Jakarta but recent floods hit the coastal city particularly hard.
In January 2020, rainfall of nearly 400 milimeters (about 15 inches) overnight inundated 38 districts
of Jakarta, turned streets into rivers, caused over 60 fatalities, and displaced over 150,000 people
(Berlinger and Yee, 2020; BMKG, 2020). Recent inundation in February 2021 displaced over 1,300
people and submerged 57 neighborhoods (Afifa, 2021; Al Jazeera, 2021). A study predicts that
Jakarta’s annual flood damage costs will significantly increase by 322% to 402% by 2050
(Januriyadi et al., 2018). A major environmental threat in Jakarta, flood risks will escalate as
extreme flow events, such as rising sea level, intensify and the carrying capacity for water
absorption decreases due to rapid, uncontrolled urbanization and groundwater pumping.
Flooding in Jakarta involves biophysical and sociopolitical factors. It is a biophysical problem
because it occurs when the amount of water exceeds the evaporation rate and infiltration capacity
determined by land cover, soils, elevation, slope, hydrology, and vegetation. At the same time,
flooding is a sociopolitical issue, most often a product of uneven development through spatial
transformations that are legacies of Indonesia’s colonial past. In addition, climate change and sea
level rise - a global phenomenon - will exacerbate flooding locally. Given the interrelatedness
between biophysical and sociopolitical elements of flooding, an integrated conceptual framework
to analyze future flood risks and identify entry points for mitigation actions is necessary.
As of today, responses to flood mitigation in Jakarta have prioritized engineering solutions in the
forms of polders, canals, and reservoirs. Recently, the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian
governments initiated a number of hydrological engineering projects to mitigate flood risks in
Jakarta (Leitner et al., 2017). These highly engineered solutions have been influenced and shaped
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by the Dutch approach to coastal and river works which promotes the idea of ‘engineering with
nature’. Despite the ideal imaginaries of sustainability and resilience embedded in the concept of
engineering with nature, the transfer of this idea from the Global North to the Global South does not
always translate into solutions that are sensitive to the socioeconomic, cultural, and political reality
on the ground. It is important to note that many climate resilience projects are developed at a local
scale and yet they are increasingly promoted at international level as being universally applicable
(Goh, 2019).
Rotterdam’s storm surge barrier, the Maestlantkering, is an example of an innovative solution to sea
level rise and flooding. Completed in 1997 in response to the North Sea floods in 1916 and 1953, the
giant sea gate is the city’s final line of defense against water and a testament to a forward-looking
ecological approach. It has only had to close twice since it was built to protect the port of
Rotterdam from extreme floods. Apart from the engineering solution, what makes Rotterdam
successful in dealing with climate events is the city’s climate change adaptation strategy that
integrates flooding and sea level rise challenges into their built environment and influences
attitude and awareness towards climate resilience. At the core of Rotterdam’s climate actions is
increasing storage and drainage capacity through the incorporation of green infrastructure and
blue corridors into urban planning. In addition, research and knowledge development are one of the
three core pillars of Rotterdam’s strategy for going ‘climate proof’. As Rotterdam markets its
expertise abroad, cities that are facing similar challenges are embracing ideas of flood mitigation
infrastructure like the Maestlantkering while overlooking the hidden drivers for success beyond
engineering solutions.
In response to this hegemonic view about engineering solutions to flooding and sea level rise,
looking at hard water infrastructure projects through a political ecology lens can shed some light
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on the tendency to engineer out of climate change problems, the extent to which the reproduction
of uneven spatial development is perpetuated, and the impact of water infrastructure on local
communities. In this chapter, I first trace the linkages between urban development processes and
biophysical changes that increase flood and climate risks. In doing so, I deconstruct the way
urbanization alters LULC types as a result of complex human-environment interactions, and assess
the impact of development on urban hydrology. Then, I investigate the sociopolitical dimension of
floods in Jakarta by uncovering the colonial legacy of controlling water by exclusion, the
reproduction of fragmentation and water insecurity through engineering solutions, and the uneven
co-production of knowledge in a global network of delta cities.
2.1. Drivers of Flood and Climate Risks
Change in LULC
Urbanization is one of the major driving forces of LULC change, yet the dynamics of this change is
not well understood. Land cover change refers to the change in surface cover such as vegetation,
soil, and water. Meanwhile, land use change revolves around the ways human activities transform
the natural landscape (Patel et al., 2019). While the climate can cause land cover change and vice
versa, land use change is centered around human intervention in regards to utilization of land.
Primary factors for changes in LULC can be categorized into two types: (i) climate-induced LULC
change and (ii) human-induced LULC change. In most cases, these two types intermingle in the
process, posing challenges in attributing the causes to one specific source.
Changes in LULC contribute to climate change and the other way around. Breaking the dichotomy
between ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ in LULC change is necessary to assess the trade-offs between
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maintaining the capacity of ecosystems and the need to engineer the environment for growing
populations (Ramankutty et al., 2006). Visible outcomes of recent LULC change are most reflected
in the change from non-urban to urban uses and from non built-up to built-up areas. Globally, the
change in built-up area change has doubled from over 25% in 2000 to over 50% in 2014 (OECD,
2020). The spatial expansion of built-up area between 1990 to 2000 is highest in East Asia and the
Pacific region and Southeast Asia region with a rate of annual change of 7.2% and 6.4%
respectively (Angel et al., 2005). These trends coincide with the rapid pace of urbanization and
population growth in East Asia and Southeast Asia in the last decades.
In general, drivers of LULC change can be grouped into three categories: biophysical, economic
and technological, and demographic factors (Ramankutty et al., 2006). Biophysical factors include,
but are not limited to, climate, soils, elevation, slope, hydrology, and vegetation (Lambin et al., 2001;
Ramankutty et al., 2006), which contribute to ecosystem conditions. The variability of ecosystem
conditions across regions and their changes throughout time lead to varying degrees of and ranges
in the way humans utilize land. At the same time, progress in technology and economic
development has driven forest-cover change, desertification, cropland conversion, and built-up
area change. Interacting with these changes are nuanced aspects of demographic factors that
contribute to direct and indirect consumptive demands on land in an increasingly urbanized world
(Lambin et al., 2001). These drivers are by no means isolated from one another but are interrelated
and dynamic. For example, human settlement density geographically corresponds with lower
elevation, less than 10 meters above sea level along the coast (McGranahan et al., 2007). This
phenomenon occurs as a counter effect of hillsides. Despite being located in flood-prone areas,
many dense human settlements are engineering a way out of flood problems, altering land use and
natural systems to create conditions that support living in floodplains.
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Previous studies on LULC change have mainly focused on the loss of forest cover and biodiversity
and their impact on climate. This is due to rapid agricultural land transformation that cleared an
extensive amount of forests in the 18th and 19th centuries, and continued to intensify in the 20th
century to meet food production demands (Ramankutty et al., 2006). At the global and regional
levels, estimates of LULC change have been used to evaluate carbon emissions from land use
conversion (Watson et al., 2000), assess impacts on biodiversity and threatened species, and
measure water availability and precipitation rate. Meanwhile, analysis on LULC change associated
with urbanization and its impacts is still lacking, albeit an important phenomenon that drives
built-up area change. In the case of Indonesia, assessments of LULC change, as well as impact
analysis, are generally related to large-scale oil-palm plantations (Myers et al., 2015) and bioenergy
projects (Choi et al., 2020). In the context of urban expansion, a few studies have identified the link
between urban land use change and deforestation, hydrologic systems, and heat island effects or
surface temperature. Gaps and opportunities in the literature around LULC change associated with
urbanization include understanding feedback loops between land use conversion and climate
change; assessing thresholds for urban development and engineering; and identifying potential
impacts of overdevelopment.
Change in Urban Hydrology
Water is a key resource for living and one of the components of the earth system that is
considerably affected by LULC change. While water covers nearly 75% of the earth’s surface, less
than two percent of it is fresh, and only one percent of the freshwater is accessible for human
consumption. The cycle of water is complex, involving processes of exchange between the land,
the oceans, and the atmosphere (Shiklomanov & Rodda, 2004). Primarily, humans appropriate
water from surface water and groundwater. Changes in LULC influence the surface temperature
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and humidity, which affect levels of rainfall, creating feedback effects on ecosystems. Land
surface change also has a direct impact on both water quantity and water quality, and human
impacts on ‘the water cycle is greatest per unit area in urban places’ (McPherson, 1974, p. 15).
Changes from non-urban to urban uses are usually accompanied by more impervious surfaces and
traditionally grey infrastructure in water management, in which man-made watersheds do not have
the capacity to capture and store water at a level that is necessary to maintain stable streamflow
(Dunne & Leopold, 1978). The expansion of impervious surfaces is one of the most defining
characteristics of urban areas. As impervious areas increase, the water storage capacity
decreases. Previously vegetated areas were replaced with concrete, asphalt, metal, and stone. This
creates an impact on the natural surface and infiltration.
Experiments using catchment models have shown that when similar storms hit a watershed that is
increasingly urbanizing, a larger water volume for runoff is accumulated in a shorter amount of
time, corresponding to the increase in imperviousness. A study by Roberts and Klingeman in 1970
investigated the effects of zero percent, 50% and 100% permeable surface on hydrograph and
found that the 100% permeable watershed produces a much slower risetime, double that of the
50% permeable watershed (Lazaro, 1990). In addition, more than 10% impervious cover has been
associated with an unhealthy aquatic ecosystem (Schueler, 1994). While many studies confirmed
these findings, using impervious surfaces as the sole indicator for analyzing the impact of
urbanization and LULC change on hydrology is insu cient.
In flood-prone Jakarta, open green space decreased from 40% in 1985 to nine percent by 2002
within the city boundary while built-up areas grew outward in peri-urban spaces. The previously
slow natural process of floods has turned into a high-flow and high-frequency process (Padawangi
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& Douglass, 2015). Since 2002, the intensity of floods has continued to increase and since 2013,
intense floods have inundated Jakarta on an annual basis. The Indonesian Law of Spatial Planning,
issued in 2007, specifies a minimum of 30% of a city’s area that must be dedicated to both public
and private green spaces; 20% and 10% respectively. However, it is unclear how the threshold was
determined. Using a proportion of an urban area does not capture the complex features of urban
forms and the unique characteristics of different cities. Other variables such as population,
population density, and other proxy indicators for urban development or overdevelopment are
lacking from assessments of how much green space the city actually needs for infiltration
purposes. Not only is this threshold not scientific, but it can be used to justify the encroachment of,
and the neglect of the need to conserve open green space.
“The requirement of 30% open green space applies to all urban areas in Indonesia. For areas that
currently have lower than 30% of open green space, such as Jakarta with only about 10% of open green
space, increasing the percentage is an extremely di cult task. It’s impossible to do without
demolishing existing building structures. For urban areas outside of Java Island, where open green
space is usually at 80-90%, this threshold rather incentivizes the construction of urban megaprojects
such as malls, shopping centers, superblocks at massive scales.” (Professor in Landscape
Architecture, personal communication, February 6, 2021).
In Jakarta, along with the increase in impervious surfaces and the lack of infiltration area, the
intensity of human activities has grown and caused water stress through excessive groundwater
pumping. The intensity of extracting water from deep aquifers for drinking, sanitation, and
industrial uses, combined with natural consolidation in alluvium soils, has contributed to land
subsidence across Jakarta. A study on land subsidence in Jakarta between 1982 and 2010 showed
that Jakarta’s land subsided at a rate of one to 15 centimeters per year and up to approximately
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20-28 centimeters per year in several locations (Abidin et al., 2011). The study further found a
strong correlation between land subsidence and Jakarta’s urban development.
Land subsidence in Jakarta has direct and indirect infrastructural, environmental, economic, and
social impacts (Abidin et. al., 2015). The city’s infrastructure suffers directly from sinking land as
permanent constructions and roads crack, houses and buildings tilt and sink, underground
pipelines and utilities break, and drainage systems fail. Indirectly, land subsidence escalates water
threats particularly in coastal areas where high tide flooding occurs more often with sea level rise.
Sinking land expands flood-prone areas inland as well. The economic cost of land subsidence
manifests in damage and property value losses while the social cost presents itself in the
increasing number of people affected by deteriorating living conditions and flood risks as well as
the marginalization of vulnerable communities.
2.2. The Urban Political Ecology of Flood Vulnerability
The term ‘political ecology’, coined by Frank Thone in 1935 and further developed by anthropologist
Eric Wolf in 1972, suggests that understanding a particular ecosystem requires an investigation into
broader historical, social, and political processes (Wolf, 1972). This does not imply that ecological
factors are not important but rather questions how they interact with the issue of access, control,
and power. A political ecology framework contributes to research and policy discussion around
flood vulnerability in several ways. First, floods occur in a political space where the politics and
economics of differentiation produce uneven consequences of floods (Cohen & Werker, 2008).
Second, the broader processes in regional ecosystems are highly related to chronic flooding in
urban areas (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). Third, responses to flood mitigation and climate change
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adaptation seek to address perceived threats within specific parameters defined by those with
power. I now turn to discuss each of these points.
Flood disasters occur in a political space, where human intervention in natural ecologies produce
uneven consequences that marginalize the most vulnerable (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). Flood
issues in urban areas cannot be viewed in isolation from how water is governed and used. Political
and economic reasons tend to guide land use and water management; that is certainly the case in
Jakarta. Uses of water are directly linked to how water is distributed and allocated. If access to
water supply is a product of politics and power, then the uneven access to this service is a result of
a fragmented utility network (Kooy & Bakker, 2008b). A networked infrastructure, by which flows
and mobility are to happen, always entails a construction of barriers for those who are not in
positions of power (Graham & Marvin, 2001).
Flooding is also a consequence of socio-ecological changes that have transpired within and
beyond the urban boundary of Jakarta. As discussed, urbanization and peri urbanization have
driven LULC change in Jakarta and its surrounding area. The expansion and intensification of
built-up area and impervious surfaces increase surface water runoff while excessive groundwater
extraction causes the sediment to compact and the land to sink. This is especially problematic for
low-lying coastal cities like Jakarta because not only does it increase the risk of flash floods but
also of storm surge. As the downstream part of Ciliwung watershed, Jakarta’s flood risk is also
affected by ecological changes and water governance upstream. In the absence of a regional
watershed management system, Jakarta’s rivers and waterways are vulnerable to flooding.
Responses to flood events are influenced by how risks are defined and perceived. For informal
settlement communities in flood-prone areas, flooding is a major threat even though it has become
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a common experience. However, flood mitigation actions are taken when flooding affects a uent
areas, where it has started to take place more frequently only in the last few years. The tendency to
turn to hard infrastructure for solutions to flood problems often requires the clearing of informal
settlements on land at margins. Flood mitigation projects then become a vehicle for reproduction
of spatial and social inequalities.
The Colonial Legacy of Fragmented Infrastructure
Present-day Jakarta was previously Batavia controlled by the Dutch East India Company. A
low-lying coastal area traversed by 13 rivers, Batavia was built upon canals and waterways with
models that were scientifically calculated. Built in the early 17th century, Batavia’s system of canals
initially served solely as a transportation network of this trading post, but its function was
expanded to include flood attenuation following accumulation of sedimentation downstream
caused by a volcanic eruption of Mount Salak in the upstream of Ciliwung watershed. This
multi-grid system shaped the urban form of Batavia as a trade post of the first multinational
corporation, whose purposes were trade, exploration, and colonization. The construction,
expansion, and maintenance of this system of canals have perpetually altered the local river
ecosystems, requiring extensive sediment clearing and control as the population grew, land use
conversions took place, and volcanic eruptions occured (Octavianti & Charles, 2018; Kanumoyoso,
2011). This meant canals often got clogged and despite this issue, construction of canals carried on
as the main means of flood control.
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Figure 2. The City of Batavia in the Island of Java and Capital of all the Dutch Factories & Settlements in the East Indies.
Source: Van Ryne, 1818.
Batavia’s urban development reflected not only the idea of control through engineered systems but
also the enforcement and reinforcement of segregation. Both the visible and invisible urban fabrics
constructed along with these systems embedded class hierarchies. The visible form of segregation
through the built environment manifested in canals that were without bridges. Canals, by nature
and design, cut through land to make ways for water. The Dutch East India Company not only made
room for waterways that connected Batavia’s coast with its hinterland but also separated the lands
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and the populations within the city. Only certain canals at certain points were bridged, unevenly
dividing the city into isolated sections (Kehoe, 2015). The creation of a networked infrastructure of
canals provided access to a particular group of people while creating barriers for another.
The invisible form of separation worked through the control of access to water services based on
class division. The development of urban water supply and governance in Batavia began as the
issue around public health and waterborne diseases came to the fore in the 1700s (Kooy & Bakker,
2008b). For the first time a new network of piped artesian and spring water was constructed and
made available directly to European residents via household connections made of 53 kilometers of
enclosed pipes in the central area of the city (Colbran, 2017; Kooy & Bakker, 2008b). Conversely,
local populations were provided with limited access to safe water through communal standpipes
which was more costly than water accessed through household connections (Colbran, 2017). They
in turn relied on water managed and distributed outside the network, which was mainly sourced
through groundwater extraction wells (Bakker et al., 2008). A class-based hierarchy of waters and
water users was part of the original design of the water supply system in Batavia and continued to
shape the development and governance of urban water in postcolonial Jakarta.
Maintained Exclusions and Uneven Flood Risks
As the population of Jakarta grew sixfold, from half a million in 1930 during the colonial era to 2.97
million in 1961 after gaining independence (Salim & Kombaitan, 2009), production of water supply
increased but its distribution remained within the pre-existing network and was only expanded to
development areas. While the race-based differentiation was no longer the main feature of
Jakarta’s urban water provisions, the class-based hierarchy in water infrastructure was maintained
through neoliberal development that served upper-class residents and excluded undeveloped
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urban villages. With most populations living outside the network and without change in the system,
the increase in groundwater extraction outside areas of prioritized development was inevitable.
Excessive abstraction of groundwater in low-lying coastal zones can instigate land subsidence,
which will make the area more prone to flooding. The invisible nature of water infrastructure
complicates the issue, making this uneven distribution of water supply and services further
concealed until disruptions occur and are experienced by middle- and upper-class residents
(Colven, 2020).
Excess water in Jakarta comes from three main points of sources: river, sea, and rain. First, river
flooding occurs when water levels exceed the channel’s capacity caused by high discharge in the
upstream part of Ciliwung catchment area. Second, coastal flooding takes place during high tides,
and sea level rise will move shorelines further inland. Third, surface flooding happens when the
urban drainage system lacks the capacity to manage surface water runoff. Jakarta’s urban
development neglected these flood risks. The city continues to build up and out, focusing on the
visible image of a globalizing city. Underneath this urban progress, a water crisis grows more
rapidly than the pace of the development.
Jakarta’s water crisis can be explained in terms of both not enough and too much. Water is scarce
not only because the piped water network was built to provide access to a particular group of
people by creating barriers to the majority of populations, but also due to groundwater depletion
caused by excessive groundwater extraction and the lack of infiltration areas for groundwater
recharge. Water is also too much when flooding increases in frequency and severity. Water scarcity
and water excess bode ill for the livelihoods of over 10 million people in the floodplain. However,
within the context of uneven development, both water scarcity and water excess are experienced
differently by different classes. Water crisis is then defined according to how it is perceived by
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those in power and its response is constructed through rationalization of that power.
The Politics of Water Infrastructure
Water infrastructure benefits long-term water security but the nature of a networked system
means exclusions are part of the game. In colonial Batavia, the Dutch East India Company included
European households while excluding local populations in the building of canals and the piped
water supply network. Postcolonial Jakarta maintained a similar exclusion pattern by focusing on
development areas that serve upper-class populations. Today, water infrastructure projects in
Jakarta continue to follow this pattern albeit in new forms and arrangements of power and culture.
This raises the question about who benefits from Jakarta’s water infrastructure projects and why
they got built.
As a networked system, water infrastructure enables control of water flow, transfer of water to
certain distances, and recharge of groundwater. In the making of water infrastructure, knowledge
generation and scientific calculations are conducted according to perceived risk and benefits. The
Dutch saw the benefits of making room for water to flow further inland as it assisted the flow of
trade, transport, and capital. The construction of a multi-grid system of canals, on the one hand,
was scientifically calculated and on the other hand rationalized the distortion of river bends that
would result in the higher velocity of streamflow. The cholera outbreak that plagued Batavia at that
time led to the creation of a piped water utility network that was reserved for Europeans although
being rationalized as essential for local communities (Kooy & Bakker, 2008b). Jakarta’s clogged
waterways and drains triggered a scheme to dredge and widen 13 river channels that involved
demolition and eviction of informal settlements along the riverbanks. The revitalization of Jakarta’s
largest reservoir and the construction of a park nearby entailed the clearing of informal
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settlements and their social, political, and economic networks. Additionally, the plan for a new sea
wall may enable the city to keep the water at bay but will create barriers to livelihoods for fishers
and coastal communities in North Jakarta.
The decisions to build water infrastructure in Jakarta have come during critical junctures and
moments of crisis. This response pattern can be understood from the ways in which disruptive
events are perceived and framed. The concept of ‘framing contests’ (Boin et al., 2009) is useful in
this regard; that moments of crisis produce spaces of opportunity in which various actors seek to
exploit. In doing so, actors create narratives that minimize, acknowledge, or maximize event
significance depending on their political and policy stances (Boin et al., 2009). Jakarta’s sinking
ground has been framed by elite actors as a climate crisis related to rising seas despite the fact
that excessive groundwater withdrawal has been the main cause of land subsidence (personal
communication, January 19, 2021). Seeing this moment as an opportunity, opposing political actors
have also entered this framing contest by recognizing the water crisis as a result of government
failure in ensuring water access. The climate crisis frame assists o ce holders not only in avoiding
blame but also in redirecting it. It also helps justify the decision to plan and build water
infrastructure that will not address land subsidence problems.
2.3. A Sinking City
Jakarta is not the only city that is sinking. Many other coastal cities around the world are gradually
sinking, albeit at lower rates: from Venice and Rotterdam in Europe, to Bangkok and Dhaka in Asia,
to Houston and New Orleans in the United States. Along with some of these cities, Jakarta is part
of the Connecting Delta Cities network led by Rotterdam, in the Netherlands. In the context of
urban climate adaptation, there is little literature on the interconnectedness of globalized urban
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environments and the way networked cities operate at broader geographic scales (Goh, 2019). Yet
through these global-urban connections, ideas emerge and are mobilized beyond administrative
boundaries and limits in changing geopolitical relationships. With assistance from Rotterdam, Ho
Chi Minh City developed its Climate Change Adaptation Strategy which includes increasing water
storage and building blue-green networks. Meanwhile in New Orleans post-Katrina, a series of
workshops convening international water experts, called the Dutch Dialogues, led to the
development of the Greater New Orleans Urban Water Plan. The idea of building a giant sea wall to
save Jakarta from sinking came out of processes in which knowledge was shared within the global
network of delta cities.
Like in any network of production and movement of goods and services at the global scale, many
factors are at play in the exchanges of ideas regarding strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate
change among cities across continents and climate zones. One factor is the power dynamics,
historical and recent, in the networked co-production of climate-resilient planning and services. In
the context of global sustainability, the process of co-production revolves around interactions
among scholars, practitioners, and stakeholders who define the earth governance problem,
produce and exchange knowledge, and connect science to policy. Despite the aim of co-production
to promote horizontal accountability among actors, unequal power relations exist within individual
cities and at the interface between cities in the global networks.
After the flood that inundated Jakarta in 2007, Indonesian o cials initiated a knowledge exchange
process with the Dutch government who then shared their expertise and experience in flood
mitigation and integration of climate adaptation strategies into urban development (Minkman et al.,
2019). The process and outcomes of this co-production of flood management revealed the power
dynamics among the two actors. To begin with, in perceiving and defining flood risks, Indonesian
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stakeholders and a consortium of Dutch engineers have differing stances. For the majority of
people in Jakarta except for highly affected informal communities, small-scale floods are
considered an inconvenience that needs mitigatory actions rather than a catastrophe that requires
long-term adaptation plans as suggested by the Dutch consortium (Minkman et al., 2019; Van
Voorst, 2016). While there is a strong interrelationship between mitigation and adaptation, as well
as the need for both in planning for resilience in Jakarta, this co-production process resulted in a
plan that shifted from flood mitigation to long-term adaptation marketed under the Dutch Delta
planning expertise.
The power dynamics in the co-production decision making influenced which ideas were heard.
Decision making was also influenced by the positionality of the co-production process within
global capital flows. In 1995, the Indonesian government declared the coast of Jakarta a national
megaproject site as a strategy to make Jakarta a world city. At the heart of the project is land
reclamation in Jakarta Bay, an idea that local coastal communities were against and the Ministry of
Environment put a halt to. For Indonesia’s leader, the function of the project was twofold: a display
to the world in the era of globalization and a means to tap into international capital flows. In the
backdrop of Jakarta’s overdevelopment, the coastal area in North Jakarta is ‘the pioneer and the
last frontier for capitalist urban development’ (Kusno, 2011, p. 515). As part of the outcome of the
co-production process between Indonesian stakeholders and the Dutch consortium in 2013, the
National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) master plan was eventually integrated
into the reclamation project with the idea that real estate development on reclaimed land would
generate revenue to fund flood control infrastructure (Colven, 2017). As a consequence, this
co-production process in a global network served to reinforce power imbalances, uneven
development, and exclusions.
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CHAPTER 3. DETECTING LAND COVER CHANGE AND ASSESSING FLOOD
VULNERABILITY
Mapping, quantifying, and assessing land cover change in Jakarta can provide insights into spatial
patterns and characteristics of land transformation that have direct and indirect implications for
planning. While changes in land cover are a global phenomenon, their consequences are distinct in
different places. Despite this reality, global-scale climate models are favored over local-scale
models, with the idea that local data can simply be downscaled from global-scale data (Tsing,
2005). As a consequence, not only are local climate models and data less available, but they do not
have the recognition that global data has. Yet cities have distinct features and processes that
characterize their land transformation. The local-scale models and data are critical to
understanding changes in land cover in urban areas such as Jakarta.
3.1. Detecting Land Cover Change
Given that land cover change has spatial and temporal dimensions, the use of remote-sensing
analysis can be valuable to generate baseline information that can be built upon with near real-time
data and imagery, particularly where (reliable) spatial and non-spatial data may not be available. In
this thesis, I employ an image classification approach to detect built-up areas, non built-up areas,
and waterbodies, utilizing spectral imagery available through Landsat and Sentinel-2 data. In
particular, I apply a machine learning technique, supervised learning, to train and test satellite
imagery for classifying types of land cover. Although not without limitations, this approach allows
for the exploration of the temporal, spectral, and spatial characteristics of land cover change in
Jakarta as they affect changes in urban hydrology. The remote sensing method to detect and
analyze changes in land cover includes the following steps: (i) data acquisition and preprocessing,
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(ii) developing training sets appropriate for Jakarta’s urban fabric, (iii) image classification using a
machine learning algorithm, specifically with random forest classifiers, and (iv) accuracy
assessments.
The characteristics and patterns of mega-urban region development of Jakarta can be observed
through three different political periods and economic shifts: (i) autocratic neoliberal urbanism in
1988-1997, (ii) neoliberal urbanism in 1998-2005, (iii) rescaled neoliberal urbanism from 2006 until
present (Herlambang et al., 2018). The first phase of Jakarta’s urban development was during an
autocratic regime which paved the way for new town developments on the periphery of the city.
During the neoliberal urbanism phase, shopping center development proliferated in peri-urban
areas, outgrowing Jakarta’s administrative boundary. With increasing access to investments, both
local and foreign flows, superblock mixed-use developments that create impermeable enclaves,
have dominated Jakarta’s urban expansion since 2006.
Several factors informed the decisions in acquiring satellite imagery. First, the time frames
associated with development phases in Jakarta as mentioned above. Second, the availability and
quality of satellite images as well as the consideration of the time interval. Third, local contexts
surrounding recent major flood events in 2013 and 2020. Based on these aspects, satellite images
were then acquired for the years 1989, 1997, 2006, 2013, and 2020 (see Table 1). Satellite data for
earlier years (1989, 1997, and 2006) relies on Landsat 5 since the satellite was launched in 1984. Data
for year 2013 is available from Landsat 8 (launched in 2013). As for year 2020, the image was
acquired from Sentinel-2 which was launched in 2017.
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1989 National urbanism Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper
(TM) Level-1
30-120 USGS/Google






Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper
(TM) Level-1
30-120 USGS/Google
2013 Major flood event Landsat 8 Top of
Atmosphere Composite
15-30 USGS/Google





As inputs for image classification, images from Landsat 5, Landsat 8, and Sentinel-2 were available
and pre-processed through Google Earth Engine. I used Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper (TM) Collection
1 Tier 1 Top of Atmosphere (TOA) reflectance, through which a collection of images was filtered and
an image with the lowest cloud cover was selected for 1989, 1997, and 2006 respectively. For
Landsat 8, I created a cloud-free composite with top-of-atmosphere calibration from raw imagery
filtered to the year of 2013. As for the Sentinel-2 data, I used a collection of images from Sentinel-2
Level 1-C TOA reflectance for 2020 to make a composite image using the median values and
performed cloud masking.
For the purpose of this research, land cover classification is categorized into three surface types:
(i) built-up area, (ii) non built-up area, and (iii) waterbody. I operationalize built-up areas as the
presence of buildings, paved surfaces, and commercial and industrial sites. Non built-up areas
include vegetation, barren lands, and forests, while the waterbody category covers rivers, canals,
reservoirs, wetlands, and sea. For each pre-processed satellite data, a set of training data was
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created and every sample data point was labeled as built-up, non-built up, or waterbody based on
visual interpretation of satellite images. These training datasets (in polygons) were then used for
supervised classification to analyze land cover change in Jakarta from 1989 until 2020.
To detect built-up areas, non built-up areas, and waterbodies, as well as their changes, I ran an
image classification process with supervised learning technique. Initially, I collected values for all
pixels within each polygon in training datasets by overlaying the polygons on the preprocessed
satellite data. I then applied a random forest algorithm to build a classifier and trained the classifier
across spectral bands for each satellite image. The spectral bands used for image classification
can be found in Appendix. The trained classifier was then used to classify each satellite image in
Google Earth Engine.
3.2. Results
The supervised classification of satellite imagery showed that in the beginning of the autocratic
neoliberal urbanism period in 1989, which was characterized by new town developments around the
city center, built-up areas made up 48.64% of the city’s total area while non built-up areas covered
42.89%, and the rest was water. The classified satellite imagery for the year 1997 revealed that
built-up areas grew to 58.49% while non built-up areas decreased to 36.35%. Although there was a
vacuum in real estate development projects in Jakarta in 1997, shortly after in 1998, construction
began and intensified around shopping center development (Herlambang et al., 2018). That was the
start of the neoliberal urbanism phase, where there was minimal control of land development until
2006. The trend continues in the rescaled neoliberal urbanism period in which superblock
development characterized real estate development in Jakarta. By 2020, built-up areas had gone
up to over 80%, leaving non built-up areas and water below 15% independently.
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Figure 3. Proportion of built-up area, non built-up area, and waterbody in Jakarta in 1989, 1997, 2006, 2013, and 2020.
Source: Author, 2021.
To assess the validity of the classification algorithm, I ran accuracy assessments and performed
parameter tuning and optimization. I further compared these results with a recent study on the
impact of land cover change on surface temperature in Jakarta, which uses satellite imagery for
the years 1990 and 2015. The study shows that the built-up area in 1990 accounted for 51.78% of the
city’s area and non built-up area 46% (Danniswari et al., 2020). According to this study, the built-up
area had climbed up to 80.96% by 2015. Another study also presents similar findings around
Jakarta’s urban expansion analyzed through a temporal analysis of satellite data (Garschagen et al.,
2018).
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Figure 4. Detection of built-up area, non built-up area, and waterbody in Jakarta in 1989, 1997, 2006, 2013, and 2020.
Source: Author, 2021.
The remote-sensing analysis of land cover change facilitated the observation of spatial patterns of
urban development dynamics. The land cover change analysis in Jakarta from 1989 to 2020
revealed the way in which urban development has occurred in Jakarta: from the city center
towards the periphery in all directions. The most apparent change can be seen towards the south
part of the city where the majority of non built-up areas, including grassland, forest, wetlands, had
been replaced with built-up areas. Towards the east and west sides of the city, new town
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developments had proliferated the urban fringe. In the northeastern part of Jakarta, built-up areas
had encroached into mangrove forests in the area while lands had been reclaimed.
The remote-sensing analysis of changes in land cover is not without limitations. First, ground truth
data are not available to validate the generated outputs from the image classification processes
that were performed. Second, satellite imagery for earlier years have lower resolutions and may
have undercounted or overcounted one type of land cover or the other. Third, the training samples
were developed and labeled manually through visual interpretation. For that reason, training
samples could have built-in biases despite the best effort to reduce or eliminate them. Despite
these limitations, remotely-sensed data can provide baseline information to better understand
spatial patterns and characteristics of land cover change in Jakarta over time.
3.3. Assessing Flood Vulnerability
In assessing flood vulnerability, I explore the relationship between land cover change and areas that
are flood prone. First, I combined remote-sensing analysis of land cover change with flood data to
analyze trends and patterns identified in flood-prone areas compared to areas that are not flood
prone. According to the Regional Disaster Management Agency in 2013, an area of around 118
square kilometers covering 356 neighborhoods are in flood-prone areas. Then, I incorporated
population density into the analysis as a proxy indicator for urban development intensity within the
flood-prone areas.
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Figure 5. Land cover change in flood-prone areas and non flood-prone areas.
Source: Author, 2021; Flood Data: OSM, BPBD, 2013.
Within Jakarta’s flood-prone areas, the increase in built-up areas is highest with 26.19% change
(Table 2; Figure 7) during the earlier urbanization phase in 1989-1997, under the autocratic
neoliberal urbanism period. Meanwhile, outside flood-prone areas, the bulk of growth in built-up
areas occurred in the second urbanization phase during the neoliberal urbanism period with
19.60% change (Table 2; Figure 7). Generally, built-up areas have continued to increase while
non-built up areas have kept decreasing, albeit at a slower rate, for both flood-prone areas and non
flood-prone areas. What is not captured in this land cover change analysis is the vertical expansion
of Jakarta’s urban development. While the built-up area growth has decelerated recently, it does
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not connote that urban development and expansion have stagnated or declined, particularly given
the fact that superblock developments have characterized the rescaled neoliberal urbanism phase
since 2006.
Figure 6. Proportion of built-up area, non built-up area, and waterbody within and outside flood prone areas.
Source: Author, 2021; Flood Data: OSM, BPBD, 2013.
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Table 2. Change in Built-Up Area and Non Built-Up Area Within and Outside Flood-Prone Areas
Year Percent Change in Flood-Prone Area Percent Change in Non Flood-Prone Area
Built-up Non built-up Built-up Non built-up
1989-1997 25.19 -13.31 16.06 -15.84
1997-2006 14.61 -34.90 19.60 -38.52
2006-2013 16.09 -28.19 9.48 -28.82
2013-2020 3.04 -10.22 3.61 -17.67
Source: Author, 2021; Flood Data: OSM, BPBD, 2013.
Table 3. Population Density in Flood-Prone Areas Compared to City-Wide Averages
Year Population Density (per square kilometer)




Source: Author, 2021; Flood Data: OSM, BPBD, 2013; Population: WorldPop, 2020.
Since 2006, population density has continued to increase in flood-prone areas. Compared to the
average population density of the entire city, population density in flood-prone areas has been
lower but is increasingly getting closer to the city-wide trend. At the same time, the loss of
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waterbodies in flood-prone areas is more apparent compared to the decrease in areas that are not
flood prone (Figure 7). The loss of waterbodies means the depletion in water storage and infiltration
capacity. Despite the recognition that flood-prone areas cover 356 neighborhoods across Jakarta,
population growth as well as the increase in built-up areas in these neighborhoods could further
exacerbate the threat of flood risks. This is particularly alarming for the northern part of Jakarta
where sea level rise and storm surge can create compounding effects that exponentially increase
damage and impacts in these areas.
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CHAPTER 4. MAKING ROOM FOR WATER: PLUIT RESERVOIR REVITALIZATION
PROJECT
Pluit Reservoir is the largest reservoir in Jakarta with a catchment area of over 2,083 hectares, a
storage area of 80 hectares, and a storage capacity of over three million cubic meters. Sitting on
previously existing wetlands in Penjaringan subdistrict, the reservoir functions as flood control
infrastructure by collecting water from lands below tide level and pumping out water into the sea.
Pluit Reservoir began its construction in 1968, during the New Order era, 23 years after
independence (Directorate General of Human Settlements, 2013). However, this polder concept was
part of the broader flood mitigation plan proposed in 1919 under the colonial era by Herman van
Breen, a Dutch engineer who was tasked with controlling the water flows in Ciliwung watershed
from upstream to downstream in Jakarta Bay (Gunawan, 2010). Despite the comprehensive
approach of this plan, as the reservoir was constructed 49 years later when population had
increased and Jakarta’s urban environments had changed, the polder concept needed a
reexamination rather than a direct implementation of the original plan.
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Figure 7. Map of North Jakarta and Pluit Reservoir location. Source: Author, 2021
The motivation to construct Pluit Reservoir stems from the flood events in 1960 and 1963 which
inundated the compound of the Presidential Palace located at the city center of Jakarta. It was
built to protect neighborhoods deemed as strategic areas in Jakarta. The Dutch provided a loan of
38 million Dutch Guilders to fund construction costs while the Indonesian government committed
three million Dutch Guilders to acquire land for the purpose of the project (Gunawan, 2010). As part
of a system of canals, Pluit Reservoir’s effectiveness relies on the existence and performance of
the waterways and polders within the calibrated network in the original design. Which
infrastructure gets built first or at all depends on which neighborhoods and areas are recognized as
having higher flood risks. At that time, protecting the National Palace and the surrounding areas
was of high priority. Pluit Reservoir was completed in 1980 but it was not until several years later,
when other polders that help to protect other neighborhoods from flood events were built, that the
reservoir became effective for flood control purposes.
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Initially, the area where Pluit Reservoir is located was fully enclosed for flood control infrastructure.
As the reservoir was undergoing construction, the agency in charge of the development of the Pluit
area built single-family houses over 135 hectares of land and industrial sites on 285 hectares of land
(Jakarta Regional People’s Representative Council, 1971). At the same time, a few structures of
informal settlements began to emerge and continued to grow along the edge of Pluit Reservoir.
Both cases, the development of formal residential areas and industrial uses in a protected area and
the emergence of informal settlements along the reservoir, epitomize the lack of enforcement in
land use regulations and inconsistencies in regard to spatial plans.
When I visited the informal settlements along the banks of the reservoir in mid-2013, the area
resembled a filthy, open air sewer, where polluted water and trash dominated the view. Above the
waterline, informal structures built on stilts supported the livelihoods of the residents. A lack of
adequate housing supply has propelled the development of informal settlements in the area. Added
to the absence of proper, periodic maintenance of the infrastructure, Pluit Reservoir had
deteriorated over time.
Figure 8. Muara Baru informal settlements along the banks of Pluit Reservoir in 2013. Source: Author, 2013.
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Earlier that year, heavy precipitation coupled with floodgates failure, a collapse of a canal dike, and
increased streamflow put the city’s 124 neighborhoods underwater, damaged 98,000 houses and
displaced 40,000 people in a span of two days (W ayanti et al., 2017). The same flood event also
brought business and governmental activities to a standstill, causing a total loss of approximately
$1.5 billion (Indonesia Investments, 2017). This is uncommon. While floods are a quotidian
experience for informal settlements along Pluit Reservoir, the flood in 2013 forced them out of their
decrepit stilt structures to seek temporary shelters at nearby schools and religious facilities for the
first time. At that time, Governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo was a few months into the o ce after
being elected in late 2012 and he decided that it was time to accelerate the revitalization plan for
Pluit Reservoir.
4.1. Modifying Urban Hydrology
When the Jakarta Spatial Plan 2010-2030 was launched in 2012, the government pledged to
revitalize 10 of the existing reservoirs and construct three more in North Jakarta to ensure
adequate water storage. According to a local hydrology expert, for a natural catchment area of 100
hectares (about 250 acres), a water storage area of 10 hectares (roughly 25 acres) is required to
comply with the universal law of water balance  (personal communication, January 15, 2021):
“Based on the same water budget calculations, an engineered system of water storage with water
volume modifications for Jakarta can reduce the ratio between water catchment area and water
storage area from 10:1 to 100:1. Jakarta’s area of 661 square kilometers (about 255 square miles) will
only require 661 hectares of water storage area with the capacity of 30-40 million cubic meters.”
(Hydrology Expert, personal communication, January 15, 2021)
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Urban hydrological principles and scientific approaches are valuable for mitigating flood risks but
their application is not always straightforward. Jakarta’s channelized rivers, sinking land, and
changing hydrologic cycles present a challenge for surface runoff impacts, especially given the
granularity of surface climate and land cover across the city. Investing in one or a few highly
engineered water infrastructure alone will not meet the requirements based on the calculated
ratio. To achieve this goal, water storage infrastructure needs to be linked with green and blue
corridors throughout the city. The 2030 Jakarta Spatial Plan includes provisions to increase
green-blue corridors with targets of 30% of the city’s area for open green space and five percent
for blue space such as rivers, canals, and reservoirs. Currently, open green space makes up less
than 10% of Jakarta’s total area (Wahdaniyat, 2019) and over 80% of the city is built-up area, based
on the analysis of land cover change in the previous chapter. Increasing open green space and
expanding blue space require exercising the power of eminent domain. That was the case with
revitalizing Pluit Reservoir through integrated blue and green infrastructure.
With a budget of $1.3 billion in 2012-2017 (C40, 2016), the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project
aimed to restore the water storage capacity and develop a 20-hectare park on the northwest side
of the reservoir. In order to meet these objectives, informal settlements along the banks would
need to be cleared to make room for the blue-green infrastructure. By that time, these informal
settlements were home to thousands of households, the majority of whom live below the poverty
line, work in the informal sector, and are undocumented. Not having access to piped water supply
or any other service, they spend one third of their income on water sold in plastic containers by
local vendors. Access to clean water is costly for the poorest. Yet water comes abundantly in
another form for these informal settlement residents, which make up almost 12% of the population
in North Jakarta (Cities Alliance, 2015). Sixty-eight percent of informal settlements in North
Jakarta are located in flood-prone areas and face flooding annually (Cities Alliance, 2015). In 2007,
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over 70% of these settlements within an area of 71.22 square kilometers were affected by flooding
(World Bank, 2011), the largest share of area and population compared to informal settlements in
other parts of Jakarta.
4.2. The Case for Relocation of Informal Settlements
The process of the revitalization project involved demolitions, evictions, and resistance
surrounding informal settlements at the banks of Pluit Reservoir. The first demolition occurred
immediately after the flood in 2013, affecting almost 1,000 out of the 6,800 households along the
banks of the reservoir. The city had allocated 2.3 hectares of land to construct low-income housing
nearby but it could only accommodate a small fraction of affected communities. Twenty kilometers
away from the reservoir, along the coast of Jakarta, the government was carrying out renovations
of a large-scale housing project for low-income communities where it compelled residents evicted
from Pluit Reservoir to relocate to. Some evicted residents agreed to the negotiated relocation but
many resisted, pushing back the relocation timeline that the government had set. The demolition
of informal structures and the dredging of the reservoir continued even as informal settlement
communities demonstrated resistance and drove collective action that influenced community
resilience to floods (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). While restoring Pluit Reservoir to its optimal
capacity is vital, the existence, eviction, and relocation of informal settlements along its banks
presented visible signs of systemic problems around housing.
“We were pressed on time when we kicked off the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project… We had to
implement the project when there was no adequate housing supply to relocate affected residents, and
socialization and information sessions had not been conducted thoroughly… We received many
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complaints from a human-rights standpoint during the implementation of the project… “ (Government
Staff Member, personal communication, January 17, 2021)
From a human rights perspective, informal settlements have a dual nature; they emerge from the
exclusionary system of formal housing and land tenure, yet they are a form of rights claiming that
challenges spatial exclusion (OHCHR, 2014). A rights-based approach also recognizes the right to
remain in situ in the case of an informal settlement upgrading, and the right to be housed nearby
when relocation is inevitable (OHCHR, 2014). Forced evictions are a violation to the right to
adequate housing. On the ground in Jakarta, these rights are often denied because their
occupation on land at margins is deemed as ‘illegal’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
The clearing of informal settlements in Jakarta have occured since the 1990s in the name of ‘public
interest’ projects. While informal settlements are evicted from protected green areas such as
riverbanks, commercial development and shopping malls are oftentimes allowed to trespass the
very same areas (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Rukmana, 2015). In Penjaringan subdistrict, where
Pluit Reservoir is located, luxury apartments and residential development have extensively
encroached on mangroves and tidal wetlands which function as a natural flood storage. Today,
when tides rise in Jakarta Bay, water from the sea comes in, flows out of canals and rivers, and
floods the city. Even though informal settlements have been blamed for worsening floods and
clogged rivers, the same could be said about any ‘formal’ development that disrupts the ecosystem
necessary for preventing floods.
The Public Order Law No. 8 of 2007, which puts a ban on building structures on the banks of rivers,
reservoirs, or ponds, is used to justify the dispossession of informal settlement residents’ from
their homes (Leitner & Sheppard, 2018), as well as from the informal networks that support their
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livelihoods. For decades, although inadequate, informal structures along the banks of Pluit
Reservoir had provided low-income communities and migrants not only a place to live but also
informal economy and social networks, through which these communities found sources of
livelihood. They worked as fish traders, fishermen and fisherwomen, informal vendors, trash
pickers, or pedicab drivers (Padawangi, 2012), and relied heavily on close-knit informal networks of
activities. Beyond economic benefits, these informal networks played a critical role in building
social support systems, self-organization, and adaptive capacity in the face of precariousness in
relation to housing, land tenure, and environmental security, particularly flooding. Existing informal
networks also allowed these communities to partner with formal networks, such as with
universities and non-governmental organizations, and engage in resettlement planning (Padawangi
& Douglass, 2015). As the government made room for green and blue infrastructure at Pluit
Reservoir, the relocation of informal communities created barriers to their access to jobs and
sustainable livelihoods.
4.3. Perceptions of Risk
Flooding is a constant threat on land at margins, such as the banks of waterways, yet what informal
settlement communities who occupy that land see as the highest risks are those related to
economic, social, and political factors (Texier, 2008). This perception of risks explains the rationale
around the willingness of informal settlement communities to stay in flood-prone areas for
decades, even during flood events. From an economic perspective, moving away physically from
these areas means losing access to means of income-generating activities and worsening
pre-existing financial instabilities. Social and political factors also influence the perceptions of
risk. For a long time, these informal settlement communities have relied on each other and their
limited resources to sustain themselves. In addition, their experiences with political actors have
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mostly been in the context of evictions, relocations, and resettlement, which has led to a lack of
trust in formal governance. Despite the precarious living conditions they are in, being part of these
close-knit networks provides a sense of security and the capital to cope with shocks and stresses
(Van Voorst & Hellman, 2015).
This does not imply a low awareness of ecological risks among these communities. In reality, these
communities mobilize their own networks and resources to muddle through floods, from
communicating flood-risk warnings, to managing evacuations, to navigating and negotiating
resettlement (Van Voorst, 2016). Despite the recent decentralization of Indonesia’s disaster risk
reduction and management system, aid and services often do not reach vulnerable communities in
time to prepare and cope with flood hazards. When they do, the form of services focuses on
emergency supplies rather than addressing the underlying causes of their vulnerability to flooding
(Texier, 2008). In contrast, technocratic approaches to formal flood governance in Jakarta have
demonstrated a narrow view of resilience and sustainability. Building more reservoirs, widening
waterways, and constructing flood walls may be necessary, but when infrastructure solutions to
reduce flood risks generate or increase other types of risks, they raise the issue of environmental
justice.
In the case of the Pluit Reservoir Revitalization project, the relocation of informal settlement
communities, whether to nearby low-income housing or one that is far away, had not improved
their living conditions as the relocation scheme had promised (Simarmata & Surtiari, 2019).
Households that were relocated to low-income housing nearby in Muara Baru faced issues around
water availability and affordability as well as adjusting to having to pay monthly rent without stable
income. Meanwhile, the relocation to Marunda low-income housing complex, located twenty
kilometers away from Pluit Reservoir, had generally led to increased transportation costs and less
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access to economic opportunities and social networks. In addition, despite the existence of the
relocation program, many evicted informal settlement residents were not qualified to access either
option due to not having Jakarta identification cards.
While the project was able to turn Pluit Reservoir from a ‘black lagoon’ into a performing reservoir,
strategies around revitalization of water infrastructure have been used to justify the clearing of
informal settlements and the displacement of their residents. The Pluit Reservoir Revitalization
project was only a small part of a larger climate adaptation scheme, in which the reservoir acts as
one of the pumping stations for the creation and maintenance of a giant polder. What Jakarta was
about to do next would only perpetuate the structural issue around the politics of water governance
that continue to marginalize the most vulnerable.
- 50 -
CHAPTER 5. ENGINEERING THE FUTURE: GIANT SEA WALL PROJECT
On the quest to save sinking Jakarta, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo is in a rush to build a giant
sea wall. In 2014, Jakarta began the construction of a coastal development project known as the
Giant Sea Wall project. With an estimated cost of $40 billion, the Giant Sea Wall project extends 32
kilometers from the east side of Pluit Reservoir towards the city of Tangerang in the west of
Jakarta. The project encompasses building new flood walls, upgrading the old ones, and
constructing a new waterfront city on 1,000 hectares of reclaimed land featuring an artificial island
with transportation networks to accommodate two million people. This highly visible infrastructure
megaproject on Jakarta Bay, the city’s ‘last frontier’ (Kusno, 2011), bears promises not only to
secure the city from water threats but also to attract investments.
Figure 9. Map of North Jakarta and an illustration of the Giant Sea Wall project location. Source: Author, 2021
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The master plan for the Giant Sea Wall project began to develop in 2008, a year after a major flood
slammed Jakarta during which 75% of the city was inundated, resulting in 350,000 displaced
populations and about $900 million in damage (Goodyear, 2013). The West Flood Canal, one of the
two main canals built by the Dutch 65 years earlier, collapsed during heavy rainfall and water levels
hit four meters in some areas of the city. As its primary flood defense mechanism, Jakarta’s system
of canals is outdated and overdue an upgrade considering the amount of development that has
occurred on this floodplain. Apart from being obsolete, the system of canals and waterways
requires costly maintenance in order for it to function and not cause blockage. Jakarta has been
paying the price of economic, environmental, and social damages for not maintaining the system of
canals. In the face of increasing future flood risks, Jakarta turned to the architect of its canal
system, the Dutch government, for advice in improving water infrastructure (Minkman et al., 2019)
and initiated a policy development process, which at the end resulted in the building of a giant sea
wall as a proposed solution.
The idea to build a wall to protect the coast of Jakarta raises questions about the policy
development process that took place over 12 years among local and international stakeholders.
This chapter investigates the development of the Giant Sea Wall project in the context of
co-production in the global-urban network of environmental governance, and its implications on
communities and urban systems locally. I operationalize the concept of co-production as the
process in which actors from different organizations or institutions provide inputs in the
production of goods or services, as coined by economist Elinor Ostrom in the late 1970s and further
refined in 1996 (Parks et al., 1981; Ostrom, 1996). I further analyze the ways in which the political and
power dimensions of co-production affect the outcome (Turnhout et al., 2019) and increase the
connections and disconnections among urban groups. In doing so, I explore the evolution of the
Giant Sea Wall project through processes in which unequal power relations as well as political and
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economic interests drive the narrative on climate crisis and the outcome of the co-production
process.
5.1. The Co-Production of A Giant Sea Wall
With improved diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on Water, signed in 2001 and later renewed in 2015 (Octavianti and Charles,
2018), anchored the intensive exchange of knowledge and expertise to produce solutions to
Jakarta’s flood problems. The result is the Giant Sea Wall project, which has evolved through three
phases since 2007: the Jakarta Coastal Defense Strategy (JCDS), the National Capital Integrated
Coastal Development (NCICD), and the updated NCICD.
As part of the bilateral partnership with the Dutch government, the JCDS was conducted to study
the causes of Jakarta’s major flood in 2007 and suggest alternatives to mitigate future flood risks
(Minkman et al., 2019; Octavianti and Charles, 2018). The JCDS identified land subsidence as one of
the main factors of Jakarta’s worsening annual floods and offered three scenarios to deal with the
issue. The baseline scenario assumes the abandonment of the coast of Jakarta while the area
faces an underwater future, which requires retreating 4.5 million people inland with estimated
economic losses of over $200 billion (Tarrant, 2014). The second scenario relies on onshore water
retention solutions through a set of improvements on existing sea walls, dikes, and polders, which
would not solve the issue of land subsidence without effective measures to control groundwater
extraction and increasing access to piped water supply. The third scenario presented in this study
is turning Jakarta Bay into a massive polder with an offshore retention area to increase the city’s
water storage capacity. Dutch water experts believed that Jakarta has no time to solve the issue
with the second scenario, and suggested the third scenario as the most logical solution despite the
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enormous financial investments and technical challenges that the plan would require (Bakker et al.,
2017).
To move forward with transforming Jakarta Bay into a giant retention basin, the consortium of
Dutch engineering and consultancy firms turned the idea into a master plan, known as the NCICD,
financed by Dutch o cial development assistance. At the core of the NCICD master plan is an
urban development project in the shape of the Great Garuda, a national symbol of Indonesia, that is
built on reclaimed land and functions as a giant sea wall. The NCICD is massive in all dimensions.
This megaproject proposed three construction phases, including the reinforcements of 30
kilometers (18 miles) of existing coastal dams beginning in early 2016; the development of an outer
sea wall in the western part of Jakarta from 2018-2022; and the construction of an outer sea wall in
the eastern part of Jakarta beyond 2023 (KPPIP, 2016). The artificial land of the Great Garuda is
planned to be a waterfront city covering 1,250 hectares (3,088 acres) of which 45% would be
allocated for real estate development that includes housing for various income ranges and a
business district (Bakker et al., 2017). The entire project was estimated to cost between $10-40
billion to implement (Bakker et al., 2017).
The master plan was presented in early 2014 and the Indonesian government responded positively.
However, questions arose about what the giant sea wall idea was trying to solve and why it was
adopted as a solution to Jakarta’s immediate flood problems. A study by the Indonesian Ministry of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, who was not part of the process of the NCICD master planning,
reported that the giant sea wall project would have significant impacts on coastal ecology and local
populations, especially fishing communities (Center for Research and Development of Marine and
Coastal Resources, 2015). Indonesian experts and government o cials also weighed in on these
concerns:
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“I do not think Jakarta needs a giant sea wall if we actually solve the land subsidence issue and work
towards revitalizing and maintaining the city’s 13 rivers.” (Government Staff Member, personal
communication, January 19, 2021)
“The giant sea wall concept is not appropriate for the context of Jakarta... From an ecological
resilience perspective, maintaining e ciency of urban functions needs to include socially-acceptable
measures, not only engineering solutions... The government’s decision to move forward with this idea
undermines the principles of urban hydrology because sea walls have unintended consequences to
coastal ecosystems.” (Hydrology Expert, personal communication, January 15, 2021)
In 2016, the NCICD underwent a multistakeholder assessment process for six months led by the
Indonesian National Development Planning Agency, as assigned by the President. At that time, the
MoU on Water had expanded to a trilateral partnership between Indonesia, Korea, and the
Netherlands, but both the Netherlands and Korea were not involved in the assessment process. The
result of the assessment deemed the giant sea wall project as necessary to save Jakarta from
disasters (Bappenas, 2016), but proposed changes to the NCICD master plan. With the Netherlands
and Korea, the NCICD was updated and scaled down; the giant sea wall design lost its Garuda shape
and became a mere outer sea wall (Minkman et al., 2019). In the absence of the idea of a waterfront
city on reclaimed land, the government planned to integrate the updated NCICD with the land
reclamation project that would build 17 artificial islands for real estate development.
5.2. Global Collaboration and Local Bypass
How the sea wall idea prevailed as an output of the co-production process to provide a product or
service that would save Jakarta from sinking, is worth looking into. When organizations or
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institutions participate in collaborative work of producing solutions, politics and power shape
processes and outcomes (Turnhout et al., 2019). For the Dutch, to engage intensively with Indonesia
to solve water issues in Jakarta serves several purposes. It provides an opportunity to build a
better bilateral relationship on the grounds of economic development rather than of postcolonial
influence and overseas development aid (Goh, 2019). It also serves the goal of implementing and
expanding knowledge exchange on climate proofing through the Rotterdam-led Connecting Delta
Cities Network. Despite the changing political relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands,
or Jakarta and Rotterdam, where the two parties may seem to be more on an equal footing (Goh,
2019), the process of co-production was not free from uneven power relations.
These inequalities are often apparent from the beginning of the process where the problem has
been defined by elite actors (Turnhout et al., 2019). This is evident in the JCDS which defined
Jakarta’s climate risk tolerance and prescribed a hard infrastructure strategy to mitigate floods in
the form of a sea wall. The Dutch undeniably have the experience and expertise in building an
engineering system of flood control that has been successful, particularly after a devastating flood
event caused by a storm surge in 1953. By the 1990s, the Dutch completed two massive storm surge
barriers, one of which protects the port of Rotterdam, the economic engine of the country, from
flooding. The Dutch speak from experience and proven expertise when it comes to climate
adaptation strategies.
Not only do the Dutch have the technical expertise in controlling water, they also use much more
robust metrics when it comes to calculating climate and flood risks compared to other countries.
For example, the United States commonly uses the 100-year floods (one percent probability) and
500-year floods (0.2% probability) metrics, which many American cities have found inadequate to
measure the risks given recent storm surge events that hit major coastal cities such as New York
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City and New Orleans. In contrast, the Netherlands, through the Delta Works program, builds flood
control infrastructure with exceedance frequencies of once in 10,000 per year. Meanwhile,
Indonesia lacks o cial estimation of the probability that a disastrous flood event will occur as well
as its risk tolerance.
Lacking baseline measures at the local level to assess flood risks, the Indonesian stakeholders
were less equipped to define the problem and inform suitable solutions during the participatory
process. As a specific depoliticized discourse that employs scientific arguments held by
participants in positions of power is rationalized, stakeholders with less power and influence are
expected to cooperate with predetermined objectives (Turnhout et al., 2019). The master plan for
the Giant Sea Wall project exemplifies a rationalization presented as rationality.
“...I have no idea how they jumped to conclusions that Jakarta cannot solve the land subsidence issue
and decided that the giant sea wall is the solution.“ (Government Staff Member, personal
communication, January 19, 2021)
Compounding the unequal power and depoliticization dimensions of co-production is the
complexity of the transfer of ideas between the Global North and the Global South. When imported
‘evidence-based’ approaches ignore the economic and political forces behind Jakarta’s land
development, hydrological infrastructure network, and flood vulnerability, co-production and
participatory processes reproduce unequal power relations and generate solutions that perpetuate
uneven spatial development and flood risks. To ensure the success of the Giant Sea Wall project,
keeping Jakarta’s rivers flowing into the offshore retention basin is of paramount importance. This
accelerated the ongoing work on dredging and widening of canals and rivers at the expense of
riverbank informal settlements and coastal fishing communities, even though it had been met with
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resistance (Anguelovski et al., 2016).
“Rotterdam needs a giant sea wall because of the risk of storm surge events. Jakarta’s local climate is
different from Rotterdam’s; tsunamis or earthquakes are more of a common risk that Jakarta faces. In
addition, Rotterdam is located about 30 kilometers away from the North Sea while many communities
live and work directly along the coast of Jakarta and at sea.“ (Government Staff Member, personal
communication, January 19, 2021)
“The idea of building a giant sea wall comes from the Dutch. Jakarta or Indonesia has a very different
context and model for infrastructure development. In the Netherlands, they take into account basic
rights of individuals that are impacted by a development project... Based on what we’ve seen and
experienced on the ground in Indonesia, any type of development does not assess nor mitigate social,
economic, and environmental impacts on local communities, especially when it involves relocation of
vulnerable population groups.” (Member of Community Organization, personal communication,
January 18, 2021)
“In the last decades, flood mitigation plans in Jakarta have been di cult to implement not because of
technological or engineering challenges but those related to social and law enforcement issues.”
(Government Staff Member, personal communication, January 17, 2021)
Despite the current and future impacts of the Giant Sea Wall project on their livelihoods, vulnerable
coastal communities were rarely, if at all included and consulted in any collaborative processes that
shape the outcome. “When public participation programs are conducted, usually the project has
been made into a policy. I think it is a token participation process,” said one member of a
community organization. The NCICD business plan does not consider costs associated with the
relocation and just compensation of affected fishing communities nor the improvements of the
piped water supply network (Bakker et al., 2017). Not only does the Giant Sea Wall not protect or
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benefit affected communities, it also threatens communities who are at risk of flooding and sea
level rise in the first place. As a result of unequal power relations, at both the global and local levels,
in the co-production and participatory processes of the Giant Sea Wall projects, Jakarta’s water
infrastructure once again serves those in power while maintaining and reproducing exclusions of
vulnerable communities.
5.3. Flows of Capital and (Mal)adaptation
Financing flood mitigation and climate adaptation infrastructure development has been and is a
growing challenge for cities across the world. Cities are increasingly at the forefront of tackling
climate change, yet only a small percentage of them have access to both local and international
markets. According to the World Bank, only four percent of the 500 largest cities in developing
countries are creditworthy in global financial markets while 20% are creditworthy in local markets
(World Bank, 2013). In addition, o cial development assistance and lending from development
banks have traditionally focused on rural development and regional infrastructure planning, rather
than cities. Tapping into a diverse range of funding sources is key to financing future infrastructure
needs in cities.
The designation of Jakarta Bay as a national development site through a presidential decree in
1995 was a decisive action towards attracting investments and flows of capital in the era of
globalization. The site and the policy instrument were initiated during the autocratic neoliberal
urbanism phase to lay the foundations for a reclamation project consisting of artificial islands; not
to be confused with the Giant Sea Wall project. Through Jakarta’s political shifts, this highly
contested project has been stopped several times due to its impacts on the coastal ecosystem.
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When the JCDS in 2010 identified land subsidence as the main cause of Jakarta’s flood problems
but recommended turning Jakarta Bay into a waterfront city on reclaimed land that functions as a
giant polder, it suggested several things. First, this flood mitigation project could pave the way for
another form of urban development on Jakarta’s coast. At the same time, a waterfront city on
reclaimed land which becomes an instrument for real estate speculation and attracting
investments could, in theory, finance the flood mitigation infrastructure component of the project.
Given the challenge of accessing capital using traditional means to finance public infrastructure
projects, turning to private sector investments through public-private partnerships could yield
public benefits.
However, in a series of consultations, local private investors indicated financial risks around the
real estate bubble formed by the development of the waterfront city idea (Bakker et al., 2017). In
addition, based on the programs laid out in the initial master plan, the NCICD, real estate
developments on reclaimed land would likely only yield private benefits, rather than serving the
public interest by providing affordable housing and or alternatives to the issue of land subsidence.
Even though the waterfront city idea was scrapped and the project now entails only a mere outer
sea wall, the government has planned to integrate the project with a separate reclamation project
mentioned above, as a means for attracting investments.
Second, the ideation of the Giant Sea Wall project exhibited a process in which political drivers are
stronger than science or engineering. Land subsidence was identified as the problem but none of
the solutions presented throughout the three phases of co-production included any measures to
address the issue. While the NCICD points out the need to decelerate land subsidence as
imperative to the project’s success, it does not entail any initiatives to discontinue operation of
groundwater extraction (Bakker et al., 2017). Engineering solutions could be a valid solution for
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flood mitigation and climate adaptation actions. However, if co-production and collaborative
processes to produce these solutions fail to address the power and politics that influence decision




Flood Vulnerability as a Product of Fragmented Water Infrastructure
The exploration of the land-water dynamics in Jakarta through historical, social, and political
processes has revealed that flood vulnerability is a path dependent product of colonial planning
and uneven spatial development, which is maintained through neoliberal urban development and
reproduced in the era of climate urbanism. During the colonial era, Jakarta’s system of canals and
piped water network were originally built not only to control water but also to both connect and
separate particular areas and groups of people. Jakarta’s canal network was originally designed for
transport and commerce. Although flood attenuation immediately became part of its function,
after excessive sedimentation occurred, Jakarta’s system of canals has not been able to control
water and instead has caused more floods. The visible form of segregation by design was evident in
canals that were without bridges while the invisible form operated through the network of piped
water that excluded populations outside the city walls or non-colonists. The way Jakarta was
planned and built from the start, particularly through its networked water infrastructure, has
produced its own flood risks and uneven vulnerability among its population groups.
The colonial legacy of water infrastructure sets the pattern of exclusions that is maintained in
postcolonial Jakarta. Overdevelopment has driven a significant increase in built-up areas across
the city unevenly while its flood infrastructure has lacked improvements to compensate for
increased impervious surfaces and runoff. While the quantity of piped water supply has increased,
its network has only expanded to private commercial developments. Outside these exclusive
enclaves, water access remains limited, increasing reliance on excessive groundwater withdrawals
which exacerbate land subsidence and increase inundation risks. Whenever there is a decision to
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maintain and or improve these water infrastructure networks, the motivation stems from the ways
in which flood risks are perceived and by whom. While flooding is a common experience for
informal settlement communities, the response to flood risks has only come when neighborhoods
deemed important experience it.
Making Room for Water Means Dispossession on Land at Margins
One of the consequences of development on floodplains is the loss of their natural functions such
as water storage and flood attenuation. Jakarta’s system of canals, initially built during the colonial
rule as a means of transportation and trade, had to suddenly be remodeled to also withstand
floods. Stream channel maintenance and modification such as straightening and dredging become
a constant necessity, yet a costly one. The environmental cost of this system is associated with
disconnected floodplains that create conditions in which flood flows are constrained within river
channels instead of spreading out into the larger hydrologic system in connected floodplains.
Consequently, maintaining Jakarta’s urban hydrology involves increasing water storage capacity
and controlling flood flows within its networked system of waterways through the construction and
maintenance of reservoirs and polders. Beyond environmental and economic costs, this system
has direct significant impacts on communities as well.
With rapid development on the floodplain and increasing climate risks, the need to mitigate and
reduce flood risks in Jakarta always creates a tension between making room for water and making
space for land and people. Uneven spatial development throughout the three urbanization phases
in Jakarta has been characterized by the proliferation of exclusive residential and commercial
enclaves on the one hand, and on the other hand the growth of informal settlements in spaces at
margins such as riverbanks and waterways. Moments of crisis such as recent major flood events
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have forced Jakarta to make more room for water out of land where informal communities have
settled on for decades, due to the lack of adequate affordable housing. In the district in which Pluit
Reservoir is located, luxury apartments and ‘formal’ residential developments have encroached on
mangroves and tidal wetlands which function as a natural flood storage. Yet the clearing of informal
settlements has been used and framed as a climate adaptation strategy. This raises the question
around what is considered as encroachment and whom ecological security is for.
The ways in which Jakarta has been navigating the dilemma of making room for water when most
of its area is built-up are represented in the two water infrastructure cases, the Pluit Reservoir
Revitalization project and the Giant Sea Wall project. Restoring the storage capacity of Pluit
Reservoir requires the clearing and relocation of informal settlement communities along its banks.
In the case of the Giant Sea Wall project, in which Jakarta Bay would be turned into a massive
polder, the demolition of informal settlements along Jakarta’s waterways and the displacement of
small-scale fishing communities are preconditions for the implementation of the project. While
water infrastructure projects are developed to protect communities from flood risks, they often do
not provide the same level of services to different groups of people and operate at the expense of
the most vulnerable. The splintered nature of the city’s existing water infrastructure means
ecological protection for one group can be a threat to another.
Global Connection and Local Disconnection in Co-Production
As cities increasingly become interconnected and local environmental issues become global
problems, ideas around climate mitigation and adaptation travel through collaborative processes
among international actors. These processes have the potential to generate new knowledge,
values, and relations for social change. However, they often ignore the power and political
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dimensions that influence and shape decision making. As a result, these processes produce
solutions that are not sensitive to local contexts while perpetuating existing uneven power
relations and exclusions of vulnerable groups.
This is exemplified in the Giant Sea Wall project, the development of which evolved through three
phases of co-production. The first phase produced three scenarios, with the scenario in which
Jakarta Bay is turned into a massive polder with an offshore retention area presented as the
preferred solution by the Dutch water experts. The idea was to build a waterfront city on reclaimed
land that would function as a giant sea wall. Despite enormous financial investments and technical
challenges it would involve, the idea moved forward and was turned into a master plan funded by
o cial development assistance. As discussed above, local communities were not part of the
co-production process, nor were the potential environmental and social impacts of the project
taken into consideration. As concerns arose, the government proposed changes to the master
plan. Through another round of co-production, the master plan was updated, yet the giant sea wall
idea remained. The Giant Sea Wall project is currently under construction and has significantly
affected the livelihoods of small-scale fishing and coastal communities.
In Closing
The political ecology framework of flood vulnerability offers an analysis of elements that play into
the production and reproduction of water insecurity and socio-spatial fragmentation in Jakarta.
First, understanding the colonial legacy and politics of water infrastructure has elucidated the
ways in which flood risks have been created and unevenly experienced in postcolonial Jakarta.
Second, assessing how a city that was built on a system of canals has undergone rapid urban
expansion and land cover change, as shown in spatial analysis, highlights the challenges of making
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room for water; which pieces of land and whose spaces are lost in the process. Third, investigating
the tendency to turn to highly visible engineering solutions in co-production processes has
provided the opportunity to unpack the challenges of addressing existing unequal power relations
among global cities in the network despite the changing geopolitical relationships.
To conclude, I return to the announcement of moving capital cities from Jakarta to a remote
province in Borneo island. Jakarta may soon be an old capital, but it will not stop sinking. This
sinking city will still need to contend with mitigating floods and adapting to climate risks. Most
importantly, it will need to ensure ecological security for the most vulnerable. This thesis has
explored why flood vulnerability in Jakarta has been unevenly produced and the flood mitigation
strategies that have been developed. In doing so, this thesis has sought to unlearn the hegemonic
response to water crises that suggest that we can engineer solutions to flooding without
considering Jakarta’s colonial past and social, political, and economic contexts.
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APPENDIX - Spectral Bands Used for Image Classification
Bands Wavelength Resolution  (meters)
Landsat 5
B1 Band 1 - Blue 0.45 - 0.52 μm 30
B2 Band 2 - Green 0.52 - 0.60 μm 30
B3 Band 3 - Red 0.63 - 0.69 μm 30
B4 Band 4 - Near Infrared 0.76-  0.90 μm 30
B5 Band 5 - Short-wave Infrared 1 (SWIR 1) 1.55- 1.75 μm 30
B6 Band 6 - Thermal Infrared 10.40 -12.50 μm Resampled from 60 to 30
B7 Band 7 - Short-wave Infrared 2 (SWIR 2) 2.08 - 2.35 μm 30
Landsat 8
B1 Band 1 - Coastal aerosol 0.43 - 0.45 μm 30
B2 Band 2 - Blue 0.45 - 0.51 μm 30
B3 Band 3 - Green 0.53 - 0.59 μm 30
B4 Band 4 - Red 0.64 - 0.67 μm 30
B5 Band 5 - Near Infrared 0.85 - 0.88 μm 30
B6 Band 6 - Short-wave Infrared 1 (SWIR 1) 1.57 - 1.65 μm 30
B7 Band 7 - Short-wave Infrared 2 (SWIR 2) 2.11 - 2.29 μm 30
Sentinel-2
- 72 -
B2 Band 2 - Blue 496.6 nm (S2A) / 492.1 nm (S2B) 10
B3 Band 3 - Green 560 nm (S2A) / 559 nm (S2B) 10
B4 Band 4 - Red 664.5 nm (S2A) / 665 nm (S2B) 10
B8 Band 8 - Red 835.1 nm (S2A) / 833 nm (S2B) 10
B11 Band 11 - Short-wave Infrared 1 (SWIR 1) 1613.7 nm (S2A) / 1510.4 nm
(S2B)
20
B12 Band 12 - Short-wave Infrared 2 (SWIR 2) 2202.4 nm (S2A) / 2185.7 nm
(S2B)
20
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